in observing the effect on the economy and the stock market of the monetary policies followed during, and after, three very similar periods of rapid economic growth in response to rapid technological change." The other two episodes, in addition to the Great Depression itself, were the recessions in Japan in the 1990s and in the United States near the start of this century.
A Fourth Episode
As it turns out, we now have a fourth, albeit not yet completed, episode with which to test the Friedman and Schwartz hypothesis -the recession in the United States that began in the fourth quarter of 2007 and the boom period that preceded it. What makes this episode particularly interesting are the continuing comparisons between it and the Great Depression made by various commentators as events unfolded.
In this episode, like the earlier three, the quantity of money serves as the counterpart to the experimenter's input while nominal income and stock prices serve as the counterpart to the experimenter's output. Like all three earlier contractions, the one now concluding was preceded by a period of continual increases in nominal income, stock prices and the quantity of money.
In all of these episodes, history provides the counterpart to the experimenter's laboratory controls. For, as Friedman argued in connection with the earlier three episodes and as is true in this latest one, the booms all occurred in very similar economic settings -"developed private enterprise market economies, involved in international finance and trade, and with similar monetary systems, including a central bank with power to control the quantity of money."
Completing the analogy with a laboratory experiment, are the differences that history has provided in the time pattern of variations in the quantity of money, the input variable. In the expansion phases of all four of these episodes, the behavior of the quantity of money was more or less the same, increases of varying degrees during most of the for expansions. In the contraction phases, in contrast, behavior differed substantially across the four episodes, much as it would in a proper laboratory experiment.
The question of interest, therefore, is whether the behavior of the output variables in the four contractions mirrored these differences in the behavior of the input variable, the quantity of money. For the three episodes that Friedman investigated, the answer was a rather emphatic "yes." For this latest episode, the same thing holds. Table 1 , all of which are patterned on Friedman's presentation of empirical results, speak to this issue. Figures 1 through 3 show the quarterly time paths of the quantity of money, nominal income (GDP or GNP, depending upon data availability) and stock prices during the course of the 1930s contraction and the current contraction and the boom periods that preceded them. In all three charts, the series are quarterly averages aligned at the cycle peak. As in Friedman's presentation, all of these data are in the form of indices expressed as ratios of the quarterly observations to the respective averages during the six years prior to the cycle peak. The top half of Table 1 shows the cumulative increases in the quantity of money, nominal income and stock prices in all four boom phases; the bottom half shows the cumulative changes in the three variables in the contraction phases thereafter. The data for Japan in the 1990s and the United States in the 1990s and early 2000s come directly from Table 2 What stands out in particular in Figure 1 is the contrast between the behavior of the money stock after the respective business cycle peaks in the Great Depression and this latest episode.
Prior to the peak, M2 followed close to an identical upward course for much of the period in both episodes. Then, a year or so before the peaks, the two time paths began to diverge, M2 growth slowing in the 1920s episode but continuing more or less apace in the latest one. After the peaks, however, is when the real divergence sets in, with M2 during the course of the Great Depression ultimately falling by an historically unprecedented 33 per cent and in this latest episode, in contrast, actually accelerating since the peak.
Consistent with Friedman's earlier results, the difference in the time paths of the money stock is reflected in similar differences in the time paths of nominal income and stock prices. We can see this in Figures 2 and 3. In the Great Depression, nominal income began its decline at the 2 Some of my data for the United States in the 1920s and early 1930s are from different sources than Friedman's and, therefore, result in slightly different estimates of the cumulative changes during the boom and contraction phases of that cycle .
reference cycle peak and fell continuously thereafter, reaching a trough 14 quarters later at less than half its value at the peak. In this latest episode, the pattern has been very different. Nominal income continued to rise for three quarters after the business cycle peak, reflecting both the delayed decline in real income and continued increases in the GDP deflator. Nominal income declined during the next three quarters, reaching a trough in second quarter 2009 at 97 per cent of its peak value, but then in the two quarters that followed made up most of the shortfall.
In broad outline, stock prices in these two episodes exhibited similar patterns to nominal income. In the current episode, the boom was much less pronounced and, because the data span the earlier dot-com decline, began later than in the 1920s. More important from the standpoint of per cent below its value in 2008.2. That decline, however, is less than a tenth of the decline experienced during the Great Depression. Its duration is less than a third that of the real-income decline during the Great Depression. In the two quarters, that have followed, moreover, the subsequent growth in real income has erased half of that 3.8 per cent loss.
Data summarizing the movements in the nominal money stock, nominal income and stock prices in both the expansion phases and contraction phases of the Great Depression, the latest episode and the two additional episodes studied by Friedman are shown in Table 1 . These tell a very similar story to the data for the current episode. In the tatter two episodes, we see very much the same picture as the latest one -substantial increases in the nominal money stock, nominal income and stock prices during the expansion phase, and decreases thereafter that pale in comparison to those in the Great Depression. Table 2 shows the rank correlations between the cumulative changes in the nominal money stock on the one hand and nominal income and stock prices on the other. We see a positive correspondence between the magnitude of the changes in money and the other two variables on the upside in all four episodes and, more important from the standpoint of the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis, an even closer positive correspondence on the downside. These correlations range from .63 for money and nominal income during the expansion phases to 1.00
for the same two variables during the contraction phases.
Some Additional Observations
The results that I have reported here are completely consistent with the broader set of findings on the role played by money in business contractions historically. Friedman and
Schwartz in a lengthy article published the same year as their Monetary History of the United
States, entitled "Money and Business Cycles," Schwartz, 1963a,1963b ) based on an analysis of U.S. data over the period 1867-1960 concluded that:
[There is] an extraordinarily strong case for the propositions that (1) appreciable changes in the rate of growth of the stock of money are a necessary and sufficient condition for appreciable changes in the rate of growth of money income; and that (2) this is true both for long secular changes and also for changes over periods roughly the length of business cycles.
They added, however, that:
The case for a monetary explanation is not nearly so strong for the minor U.S. economic fluctuations that we have classified as mild depression cycles as the case is for the major economic fluctuations. Clearly, the view that monetary change is important does not preclude the existence of other factors that affect the course of business or that account for the quasi rhythmical character of business fluctuations. We have no doubt that other factors play a role.
Phillip Cagan in his companion study (1965) Wallace Huffman and I (1984) , in a study of the transmission of cyclical fluctuations between the United Kingdom and the United States over the period 1833-1932, pursued a twopronged approach; using historical analysis similar to Cagan's to investigate the money-income relation in severe contractions and then estimating vector-autoregressive models for the two countries combined. We derived three important conclusions from our analyses: that monetary shocks were important independent factors leading to or worsening the severity and duration of the contractions in the two countries; that in severe contractions in both countries, such shocks were the most important causative factor; and that gold flows played a key role in transmitting monetary shocks from the one country to the other. 
Conclusions
In Arthur Conan Doyle's tale "Silver Blaze" the key to Holmes cracking the case was that "the dog did nothing in the night." The dog didn't bark. In the current recession, like Japan in the 1990s and the United States at the start of this century and now again more recently, the key is also what did not happen. The Bank of Japan in the early 1990s and the Fed in both this episode and the one at the start of his century did not let financial dislocations degenerate into classic banking crises with their resultant deleterious effects on money supplies. That in turn, I believe, is the key to why none of the three recessions turned into a "great depression." Peak, trough and terminal dates are as follows: US, 1920s: 1923 US, 1920s: .3, 1929 US, 1920s: .3, 1933 .1 for both the business cycle and the stock-market cycle. Japan, 1980s: 1986 Japan, 1980s: .1, 1992 Japan, 1980s: .1, 1995 3 for the business cycle and 1983.4, 1989.4, 1993.4 for the stock-market cycle. US, 1990s: 1995 US, 1990s: .1, 2001 US, 1990s: .1, 2004 
